Fetch the MPIN encryption key fresh before every encryption

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/modules/auth/services/authApi.ts

@@ -15,15 +15,15 @@ import type {
 /**
  * `MALFORMED_REQUEST` on an MPIN call is what a stale or wrong public key looks
  * like from the client — the server will not say more, because saying more
- * would leak whether the profile exists. So drop the cached key, re-fetch, and
+ * would leak whether the profile exists. The key is fetched fresh on every
- * try exactly once more. A second failure is a real problem worth surfacing.
+ * encryption, so a retry picks up a rotated key; try exactly once more.
+ * A second failure is a real problem worth surfacing.
  */
 const withKeyRetry = async <T>(call: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> => {
   try {
     return await call();
   } catch (error) {
     if (isCbsApiError(error) && error.code === 'MALFORMED_REQUEST') {
-      mpinCrypto.invalidate();
       return call();
     }
 

src/services/security/mpinCrypto.ts

@@ -3,20 +3,11 @@ import forge from 'node-forge';
 import { v4 as uuidv4 } from 'uuid';
 
 import { apiClient } from '../api/apiClient';
+import { CbsApiError } from '../api/cbsErrors';
 import { endpoints } from '../api/endpoints';
 import type { PublicKeyResult } from '../../types/cbs';
 
-/**
+/** The key arrives as Base64 X.509 SubjectPublicKeyInfo (SPKI) DER. */
- * The server's key is configured rather than generated at startup, so it
- * survives restarts and can be pinned. It is only ever used as a fallback for
- * when the key fetch itself fails — a developer running their own backend gets
- * the fetched key, which is the safer default.
- */
-export const PINNED_PUBLIC_KEY =
-  'MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAxhaxPpoewSn+NCHJuICPVmMCO9f3VXN8zMUFryUv5kcn9rCwQMF023o+xtQCljyJdDaJE805lkp9FMZRupSro9auwmGGHTP5fgX5arn5p21LjbcITBxVIh+Uvj1tNKdxhd69xbTf98LfWGK9DspbWd9ZPk6m00La13eMLFR3iBfljzyT9pkENQ5WSvtPrN3+6JS8K9DsCgj/3WbIwwWTPlIN1rXV6gQumFaGl5CVsuibom2tA9pHTjAJi80LLFWP3I7mMkCihvNZT0/eFIBf1WCiOixm4Rt7Xk+Yh05daazMWAJhav+btknQd1gV/1oLolb5uegaobKK5g+xyzA33wIDAQAB';
-
-let cachedKey: forge.pki.rsa.PublicKey | null = null;
-
 const importKey = (base64Der: string): forge.pki.rsa.PublicKey => {
   const der = forge.util.decode64(base64Der);
   const asn1 = forge.asn1.fromDer(forge.util.createBuffer(der));
@@ -24,36 +15,31 @@ const importKey = (base64Der: string): forge.pki.rsa.PublicKey => {
   return forge.pki.publicKeyFromAsn1(asn1) as forge.pki.rsa.PublicKey;
 };
 
-const fetchKey = async (): Promise<forge.pki.rsa.PublicKey> => {
+export const mpinCrypto = {
-  try {
+  /**
+   * The server's *current* key, fetched fresh on every call — the backend
+   * contract requires it before each login and each fund transfer, so a
+   * rotated key is picked up immediately rather than failing until restart.
+   *
+   * No cache and no pinned fallback: encrypting to a key the server may no
+   * longer hold only turns a clear "could not fetch the key" into an opaque
+   * MALFORMED_REQUEST one round trip later.
+   */
+  async getPublicKey(): Promise<forge.pki.rsa.PublicKey> {
+    // A network failure here propagates as the usual NETWORK_ERROR /
+    // REQUEST_TIMEOUT from the interceptor.
     const response = await apiClient.get<PublicKeyResult>(endpoints.crypto.publicKey);
     const publicKey = response.data?.publicKey;
 
-    if (publicKey) {
+    if (!publicKey) {
-      return importKey(publicKey);
+      throw new CbsApiError({
+        status: 0,
+        code: 'UNKNOWN_ERROR',
+        message: 'Could not fetch MPIN encryption key',
+      });
     }
-  } catch {
-    // Fall through to the pinned key.
-  }
 
-  return importKey(PINNED_PUBLIC_KEY);
+    return importKey(publicKey);
-};
-
-export const mpinCrypto = {
-  async getPublicKey(): Promise<forge.pki.rsa.PublicKey> {
-    cachedKey = cachedKey ?? (await fetchKey());
-
-    return cachedKey;
-  },
-
-  /**
-   * Drop the cached key so the next encryption re-fetches it. Call this after a
-   * `MALFORMED_REQUEST`, which is what a stale or wrong key looks like from the
-   * client side — the server cannot say "your key is wrong" without leaking
-   * whether the profile exists.
-   */
-  invalidate() {
-    cachedKey = null;
   },
 
   /**
@@ -70,6 +56,10 @@ export const mpinCrypto = {
    * - `ts` is in *seconds*. Milliseconds read as ~55,000 years in the future
    *   and the request is rejected.
    * - `nonce` must be fresh on every single call, or it is refused as a replay.
+   *
+   * The result is single-use and must be sent within 120 seconds: call this
+   * immediately before each request, and never reuse one ciphertext for a
+   * login and a transfer.
    */
   async encryptMpin(mpin: string): Promise<string> {
     const publicKey = await this.getPublicKey();

src/services/storage/appDataPurge.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 import AsyncStorage from '@react-native-async-storage/async-storage';
 
 import { featureRemoteConfig } from '../../features/featureRemoteConfig';
-import { mpinCrypto } from '../security/mpinCrypto';
 import { sessionManager } from '../security/sessionManager';
 import { secureStorage } from './secureStorage';
 
@@ -72,7 +71,6 @@ export const purgeUserData = async () => {
   await featureRemoteConfig.forgetRoleScope().catch(() => {});
 
   sessionManager.clear();
-  mpinCrypto.invalidate();
 };
 
 const clearAsyncStorage = async () => {