nitesh
c20a7d0728
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Adds a per-tenant ceiling on which of the 27 top-nav sections a bank can ever show, closing a real gap the "Clerk" role's ALL_FUNCTIONS misconfiguration exposed this session: HasPermissionDirective already hid a menu a user's own role lacked, but any role carrying ALL_FUNCTIONS bypassed that check unconditionally, so a bank's own super user (or a role accidentally granted ALL_FUNCTIONS) could always see everything regardless of intent. New table m_tenant_menu_access (0541), one row per menu code, seeded enabled for every existing tenant so nothing already deployed changes behaviour. New TenantMenuAccessApiResource: - GET /v1/tenant-menu-access — dual-mode (session or X-Api-Key), same posture as ClientAllAccountsApiResource. A tenant's own users read their own list to render their nav; the platform operator reads any tenant's list with the key, to know current state before toggling it. - GET /v1/tenant-menu-access/tenants — API key only, the master tenant list for the operator's own tenant picker. - PUT /v1/tenant-menu-access — API key only, no session fallback at all, even for a super user. This is the actual security boundary: a bank's own admin has no path to lift its own ceiling, because there is nothing inside their own tenant that can satisfy this endpoint's auth requirement. 0542 splits two nav items that had been sharing a permission code with their neighbour — Loan Origination rode on MENU_ADVANCES, Investment rode on MENU_RBI — into their own MENU_LOAN_ORIGINATION / MENU_INVESTMENT codes, so all 27 top-nav items are now independently controllable. Every role that already held the shared code is granted the new one in the same migration, so this changes nothing about who sees what today. SecurityConfig: permitAll for the two API-key-only paths, same posture as the existing clientaccounts carve-out — the handler itself is what actually authenticates the caller, not Spring Security's outer gate.