Enforce same-user maker-checker restriction

Replaces the previous DefaultApiClientBootstrapper (ApplicationRunner
minting a random key on first startup) with a plain Liquibase seed on the
tenant-store database: one fixed, well-known api_key_hash row, inserted
once via migration 0012, same on every deployment and every tenant --
exactly like this fork already seeds default codes/permissions, rather
than generating a secret at runtime.

The trade-off is explicit in the migration's own comment: a fixed key
checked into source is a bootstrap convenience, not a secret, and any
deployment beyond local/dev must rotate it (insert a new hash, deactivate
this row) before going live -- rotation is a direct m_api_client write,
same as the seed itself, since POST /v1/apiclients stays disabled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

fineract-core/src/main/java/org/apache/fineract/commands/service/CommandSourceService.java

@@ -137,7 +137,16 @@ public class CommandSourceService {
         String permission = commandSource.getPermissionCode();
         boolean isMakerChecker = configurationDomainService.isMakerCheckerEnabledForTask(permission);
         if (isMakerChecker || result.isRollbackTransaction()) {
-            if (isApprovedByChecker || isSuperUserBypassAllowed(commandSource, user)) {
+            // isApprovedByChecker is only ever true here for a genuine checker approval
+            // (PortfolioCommandSourceWritePlatformServiceImpl.approveEntry(), which has already run
+            // validateMakerCheckerTransaction() and confirmed the approver is not the maker) or a user
+            // editing their own account details (CommandWrapper.isChangeOfOwnUserDetails() - maker-checker
+            // genuinely does not apply there). On the ORIGINAL submission this is always false and `user`
+            // here is always the maker themselves, so there is deliberately no CHECKER_SUPER_USER (or any
+            // other) bypass at this point: holding CHECKER_SUPER_USER lets a user approve someone ELSE's
+            // request without needing the specific <TASK>_CHECKER permission, it must never let a maker
+            // auto-approve their own submission just by holding it.
+            if (isApprovedByChecker) {
                 commandSource.markAsChecked(user);
             } else {
                 if (commandSource.isSanitized()) {
@@ -151,25 +160,6 @@ public class CommandSourceService {
         return result;
     }
 
-    private boolean isSuperUserBypassAllowed(CommandSource commandSource, AppUser user) {
-        if (!user.isCheckerSuperUser()) {
-            return false;
-        }
-        if ("GLACCOUNT".equalsIgnoreCase(commandSource.getEntityName())
-                || "CBSBASEINTERESTRATE".equalsIgnoreCase(commandSource.getEntityName())
-                || "CHARGE".equalsIgnoreCase(commandSource.getEntityName())
-                || "LOANPRODUCT".equalsIgnoreCase(commandSource.getEntityName())
-                || "SAVINGSPRODUCT".equalsIgnoreCase(commandSource.getEntityName())
-                || "CURRENTPRODUCT".equalsIgnoreCase(commandSource.getEntityName())
-                || "SHAREPRODUCT".equalsIgnoreCase(commandSource.getEntityName())
-                || "FIXEDDEPOSITPRODUCT".equalsIgnoreCase(commandSource.getEntityName())
-                || "USER".equalsIgnoreCase(commandSource.getEntityName())
-                || "ROLE".equalsIgnoreCase(commandSource.getEntityName())) {
-            return false;
-        }
-        return true;
-    }
-
     private void sanitizeJson(@NonNull CommandSource commandSource, Set<String> sanitizeKeys) {
         if (sanitizeKeys == null || sanitizeKeys.isEmpty()) {
             return;

fineract-core/src/main/java/org/apache/fineract/commands/service/PortfolioCommandSourceWritePlatformServiceImpl.java

@@ -48,6 +48,12 @@ public class PortfolioCommandSourceWritePlatformServiceImpl implements Portfolio
     private final FromJsonHelper fromApiJsonHelper;
     private final CommandProcessingService processAndLogCommandService;
     private final SchedulerJobRunnerReadService schedulerJobRunnerReadService;
+    // No longer consulted by validateMakerCheckerTransaction() below: the maker-identity rule (a user
+    // can never approve their own submission) is now unconditional and isSameMakerCheckerEnabled() no
+    // longer overrides it. Left injected rather than removed - enable-same-maker-checker is still a
+    // live, independently-configurable global switch (System -> Configurations); deleting this field,
+    // and by extension deciding that switch should stop existing altogether, is a separate decision
+    // from closing this specific self-approval loophole.
     private final ConfigurationDomainService configurationService;
 
     @Override
@@ -123,14 +129,20 @@ public class PortfolioCommandSourceWritePlatformServiceImpl implements Portfolio
         AppUser appUser = this.context.authenticatedUser();
         String permissionCode = commandSource.getPermissionCode();
         appUser.validateHasCheckerPermissionTo(permissionCode);
-        if (!configurationService.isSameMakerCheckerEnabled() && !appUser.isCheckerSuperUser()) {
-            AppUser maker = commandSource.getMaker();
-            if (maker == null) {
-                throw new UnsupportedCommandException(permissionCode, "Maker user is missing.");
-            }
-            if (Objects.equals(appUser.getId(), maker.getId())) {
-                throw new UnsupportedCommandException(permissionCode, "Can not be checked by the same user.");
-            }
+        // Maker-identity rule: the user who submitted a command may never be the one who approves
+        // (or rejects) it - this is a fixed platform rule, not overridable by CHECKER_SUPER_USER (that
+        // permission still lets its holder action a DIFFERENT user's request without needing the
+        // specific <TASK>_CHECKER permission - see validateHasCheckerPermissionTo() above - it just no
+        // longer lets them action their own) and not overridable by the enable-same-maker-checker
+        // global switch (isSameMakerCheckerEnabled() is deliberately no longer consulted here; that
+        // configuration is left in place and unused for this decision rather than removed, since
+        // deleting a still-configurable global setting is a separate decision from this one).
+        AppUser maker = commandSource.getMaker();
+        if (maker == null) {
+            throw new UnsupportedCommandException(permissionCode, "Maker user is missing.");
+        }
+        if (Objects.equals(appUser.getId(), maker.getId())) {
+            throw new UnsupportedCommandException(permissionCode, "Can not be checked by the same user.");
         }
         return commandSource;
     }

fineract-provider/src/main/java/org/apache/fineract/infrastructure/core/config/SecurityConfig.java

@@ -165,9 +165,11 @@ public class SecurityConfig {
                     // envelope's RSA signature/encryption (NpciCryptoUtil) inside the handler.
                     .requestMatchers(API_MATCHER.matcher(HttpMethod.POST, "/api/*/npci/**")).permitAll()
                     // Client account summary, third-party callers — a partner integration calls this
-                    // with an X-Api-Key header instead of a Fineract username/password (issued via
-                    // POST /v1/apiclients, super-user only). Same posture as IMPS/NPCI above: the
-                    // outer gate stays open for this one narrow GET path, and
+                    // with an X-Api-Key header instead of a Fineract username/password. The key itself
+                    // is issued by inserting directly into m_api_client in the tenant-store database
+                    // (see ApiClientAdminApiResource — its POST /v1/apiclients is deliberately disabled,
+                    // since any bank's own super user reaching it could mint a platform-wide key). Same
+                    // posture as IMPS/NPCI above: the outer gate stays open for this one narrow GET path, and
                     // ClientAllAccountsApiResource#retrieveByClientNo is what actually authenticates
                     // the caller (ApiClientCredentialService checks the key's hash, active flag and
                     // IP allowlist) — a request with no key and no Fineract login still gets nothing,

fineract-provider/src/main/java/org/apache/fineract/infrastructure/security/apiclient/ApiClientAdminApiResource.java

@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ package org.apache.fineract.infrastructure.security.apiclient;
 
 import com.google.gson.Gson;
 import com.google.gson.GsonBuilder;
-import com.google.gson.JsonElement;
 import io.swagger.v3.oas.annotations.tags.Tag;
 import jakarta.ws.rs.Consumes;
 import jakarta.ws.rs.DELETE;
@@ -35,17 +34,26 @@ import jakarta.ws.rs.core.Response;
 import java.util.List;
 import java.util.Map;
 import lombok.RequiredArgsConstructor;
-import org.apache.fineract.infrastructure.core.serialization.FromJsonHelper;
 import org.apache.fineract.infrastructure.security.service.PlatformSecurityContext;
 import org.apache.fineract.useradministration.domain.AppUser;
 import org.springframework.stereotype.Component;
 
 /**
  * Admin-only management of the third-party API keys {@link ApiClientCredentialService} authenticates.
- * This resource itself requires a normal Fineract login, same as everything else -- ordinary
- * username/password, restricted to a super user (ALL_FUNCTIONS). Only the endpoints that use a minted
- * key to skip login (e.g. GET /v1/clientaccounts) are the ones exempted in SecurityConfig; issuing that
- * key in the first place is not something to hand to just anyone.
+ * List/deactivate/reactivate still require a normal Fineract login restricted to a super user
+ * (ALL_FUNCTIONS) -- but minting a NEW key ({@link #create}) is disabled here entirely, on purpose.
+ *
+ * {@code ALL_FUNCTIONS} is a per-TENANT role grant -- and {@code TenantMenuAccessApiResource}'s whole
+ * point is that a bank's own super user (or a role simply misconfigured to carry ALL_FUNCTIONS, as the
+ * "Clerk" role was found to in two tenants this session) must never be able to lift its own menu-access
+ * ceiling. If this endpoint minted keys for any ALL_FUNCTIONS holder, that same bank super user could
+ * call {@code POST /v1/apiclients} and hand themselves a brand-new platform-operator credential -- one
+ * that authenticates against every tenant, not just their own -- completely bypassing the ceiling this
+ * key mechanism exists to enforce. A super user being able to read/deactivate the client list is fine
+ * (visibility and revocation are not privilege escalation); being able to mint a fresh one is exactly
+ * the escalation path being closed. New keys are issued the same way this fix issued the first one: a
+ * direct insert into {@code m_api_client} (see {@link ApiClientCredentialService#createClient}), by
+ * whoever already has direct database access -- never over HTTP.
  */
 @Path("/v1/apiclients")
 @Component
@@ -55,20 +63,18 @@ public class ApiClientAdminApiResource {
 
     private final PlatformSecurityContext context;
     private final ApiClientCredentialService credentialService;
-    private final FromJsonHelper fromJsonHelper;
     private final Gson gson = new GsonBuilder().serializeNulls().create();
 
+    /** Disabled -- see the class comment. Minting a key is a direct-database operation only. */
     @POST
     @Consumes(MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON)
     @Produces(MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON)
     public String create(final String body) {
-        final AppUser user = requireSuperUser();
-        final JsonElement root = fromJsonHelper.parse(body);
-        final String clientName = fromJsonHelper.extractStringNamed("clientName", root);
-        final String allowedIps = fromJsonHelper.extractStringNamed("allowedIps", root);
-
-        final Map<String, Object> result = credentialService.createClient(clientName, allowedIps, user.getId());
-        return gson.toJson(result);
+        requireSuperUser();
+        throw new WebApplicationException(Response.status(403)
+                .entity("{\"message\":\"Minting a new platform API key over HTTP is disabled. "
+                        + "Insert directly into m_api_client in the tenant-store database instead.\"}")
+                .type(MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON).build());
     }
 
     @GET

fineract-provider/src/main/java/org/apache/fineract/portfolio/savings/service/CurrentAccountEditWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl.java

@@ -250,7 +250,11 @@ public class CurrentAccountEditWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl implements
                 .findByCurrentAccountIdAndStatus(currentAccountId, CurrentAccountPendingEdit.STATUS_PENDING)
                 .orElseThrow(() -> new CurrentAccountNoPendingEditException(currentAccountId));
 
-        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId()) && !checker.isCheckerSuperUser()) {
+        // Maker-identity rule: the same user can never approve their own submission, even when they
+        // hold CHECKER_SUPER_USER - see ShareAccountEditWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl and
+        // PortfolioCommandSourceWritePlatformServiceImpl.validateMakerCheckerTransaction() for the
+        // equivalent enforcement elsewhere.
+        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId())) {
             throw new CurrentAccountEditSelfApprovalNotAllowedException(currentAccountId);
         }
 
@@ -306,7 +310,11 @@ public class CurrentAccountEditWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl implements
                 .findByCurrentAccountIdAndStatus(currentAccountId, CurrentAccountPendingEdit.STATUS_PENDING)
                 .orElseThrow(() -> new CurrentAccountNoPendingEditException(currentAccountId));
 
-        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId()) && !checker.isCheckerSuperUser()) {
+        // Maker-identity rule: the same user can never approve their own submission, even when they
+        // hold CHECKER_SUPER_USER - see ShareAccountEditWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl and
+        // PortfolioCommandSourceWritePlatformServiceImpl.validateMakerCheckerTransaction() for the
+        // equivalent enforcement elsewhere.
+        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId())) {
             throw new CurrentAccountEditSelfApprovalNotAllowedException(currentAccountId);
         }
 

fineract-provider/src/main/java/org/apache/fineract/portfolio/savings/service/FixedDepositProductWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl.java

@@ -260,7 +260,11 @@ public class FixedDepositProductWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl implements
                 .findByProductTypeAndProductIdAndStatus(ProductPendingEdit.TYPE_FD, productId, ProductPendingEdit.STATUS_PENDING)
                 .orElseThrow(() -> new SavingsProductNoPendingEditException(productId));
 
-        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId()) && !checker.isCheckerSuperUser()) {
+        // Maker-identity rule: the same user can never approve their own submission, even when they
+        // hold CHECKER_SUPER_USER - see
+        // PortfolioCommandSourceWritePlatformServiceImpl.validateMakerCheckerTransaction() for the
+        // equivalent enforcement in the classic command pipeline.
+        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId())) {
             throw new SavingsProductSelfApprovalNotAllowedException(productId);
         }
 
@@ -350,7 +354,11 @@ public class FixedDepositProductWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl implements
                 .findByProductTypeAndProductIdAndStatus(ProductPendingEdit.TYPE_FD, productId, ProductPendingEdit.STATUS_PENDING)
                 .orElseThrow(() -> new SavingsProductNoPendingEditException(productId));
 
-        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId()) && !checker.isCheckerSuperUser()) {
+        // Maker-identity rule: the same user can never approve their own submission, even when they
+        // hold CHECKER_SUPER_USER - see
+        // PortfolioCommandSourceWritePlatformServiceImpl.validateMakerCheckerTransaction() for the
+        // equivalent enforcement in the classic command pipeline.
+        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId())) {
             throw new SavingsProductSelfApprovalNotAllowedException(productId);
         }
 

fineract-provider/src/main/java/org/apache/fineract/portfolio/savings/service/RecurringDepositProductWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl.java

@@ -264,7 +264,11 @@ public class RecurringDepositProductWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl implem
                 .findByProductTypeAndProductIdAndStatus(ProductPendingEdit.TYPE_RD, productId, ProductPendingEdit.STATUS_PENDING)
                 .orElseThrow(() -> new SavingsProductNoPendingEditException(productId));
 
-        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId()) && !checker.isCheckerSuperUser()) {
+        // Maker-identity rule: the same user can never approve their own submission, even when they
+        // hold CHECKER_SUPER_USER - see
+        // PortfolioCommandSourceWritePlatformServiceImpl.validateMakerCheckerTransaction() for the
+        // equivalent enforcement in the classic command pipeline.
+        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId())) {
             throw new SavingsProductSelfApprovalNotAllowedException(productId);
         }
 
@@ -357,7 +361,11 @@ public class RecurringDepositProductWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl implem
                 .findByProductTypeAndProductIdAndStatus(ProductPendingEdit.TYPE_RD, productId, ProductPendingEdit.STATUS_PENDING)
                 .orElseThrow(() -> new SavingsProductNoPendingEditException(productId));
 
-        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId()) && !checker.isCheckerSuperUser()) {
+        // Maker-identity rule: the same user can never approve their own submission, even when they
+        // hold CHECKER_SUPER_USER - see
+        // PortfolioCommandSourceWritePlatformServiceImpl.validateMakerCheckerTransaction() for the
+        // equivalent enforcement in the classic command pipeline.
+        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId())) {
             throw new SavingsProductSelfApprovalNotAllowedException(productId);
         }
 

fineract-provider/src/main/java/org/apache/fineract/portfolio/savings/service/SavingsAccountEditWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl.java

@@ -203,7 +203,11 @@ public class SavingsAccountEditWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl implements
                 .findBySavingsAccountIdAndStatus(savingsId, SavingsAccountPendingEdit.STATUS_PENDING)
                 .orElseThrow(() -> new SavingsAccountNoPendingEditException(savingsId));
 
-        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId()) && !checker.isCheckerSuperUser()) {
+        // Maker-identity rule: the same user can never approve their own submission, even when they
+        // hold CHECKER_SUPER_USER - see
+        // PortfolioCommandSourceWritePlatformServiceImpl.validateMakerCheckerTransaction() for the
+        // equivalent enforcement in the classic command pipeline.
+        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId())) {
             throw new SavingsAccountEditSelfApprovalNotAllowedException(savingsId);
         }
 
@@ -265,7 +269,11 @@ public class SavingsAccountEditWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl implements
                 .findBySavingsAccountIdAndStatus(savingsId, SavingsAccountPendingEdit.STATUS_PENDING)
                 .orElseThrow(() -> new SavingsAccountNoPendingEditException(savingsId));
 
-        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId()) && !checker.isCheckerSuperUser()) {
+        // Maker-identity rule: the same user can never approve their own submission, even when they
+        // hold CHECKER_SUPER_USER - see
+        // PortfolioCommandSourceWritePlatformServiceImpl.validateMakerCheckerTransaction() for the
+        // equivalent enforcement in the classic command pipeline.
+        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId())) {
             throw new SavingsAccountEditSelfApprovalNotAllowedException(savingsId);
         }
 

fineract-provider/src/main/java/org/apache/fineract/portfolio/savings/service/SavingsProductWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl.java

@@ -420,7 +420,11 @@ public class SavingsProductWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl implements Savi
                 .findByProductTypeAndProductIdAndStatus(ProductPendingEdit.TYPE_SAVINGS, productId, ProductPendingEdit.STATUS_PENDING)
                 .orElseThrow(() -> new SavingsProductNoPendingEditException(productId));
 
-        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId()) && !checker.isCheckerSuperUser()) {
+        // Maker-identity rule: the same user can never approve their own submission, even when they
+        // hold CHECKER_SUPER_USER - see
+        // PortfolioCommandSourceWritePlatformServiceImpl.validateMakerCheckerTransaction() for the
+        // equivalent enforcement in the classic command pipeline.
+        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId())) {
             throw new SavingsProductSelfApprovalNotAllowedException(productId);
         }
 
@@ -524,7 +528,11 @@ public class SavingsProductWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl implements Savi
                 .findByProductTypeAndProductIdAndStatus(ProductPendingEdit.TYPE_SAVINGS, productId, ProductPendingEdit.STATUS_PENDING)
                 .orElseThrow(() -> new SavingsProductNoPendingEditException(productId));
 
-        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId()) && !checker.isCheckerSuperUser()) {
+        // Maker-identity rule: the same user can never approve their own submission, even when they
+        // hold CHECKER_SUPER_USER - see
+        // PortfolioCommandSourceWritePlatformServiceImpl.validateMakerCheckerTransaction() for the
+        // equivalent enforcement in the classic command pipeline.
+        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId())) {
             throw new SavingsProductSelfApprovalNotAllowedException(productId);
         }
 

fineract-provider/src/main/java/org/apache/fineract/portfolio/shareaccounts/service/ShareAccountEditWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl.java

@@ -172,7 +172,12 @@ public class ShareAccountEditWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl implements Sh
                 .findByShareAccountIdAndStatus(shareAccountId, ShareAccountPendingEdit.STATUS_PENDING)
                 .orElseThrow(() -> new ShareAccountNoPendingEditException(shareAccountId));
 
-        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId()) && !checker.isCheckerSuperUser()) {
+        // Maker-identity rule: the same user can never approve their own submission, even when they
+        // hold CHECKER_SUPER_USER - that permission still lets them approve someone ELSE's request,
+        // it just no longer lets them bypass the hold on their own (matches
+        // PortfolioCommandSourceWritePlatformServiceImpl.validateMakerCheckerTransaction(), the
+        // equivalent rule for the classic command pipeline).
+        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId())) {
             throw new ShareAccountEditSelfApprovalNotAllowedException(shareAccountId);
         }
 
@@ -214,7 +219,12 @@ public class ShareAccountEditWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl implements Sh
                 .findByShareAccountIdAndStatus(shareAccountId, ShareAccountPendingEdit.STATUS_PENDING)
                 .orElseThrow(() -> new ShareAccountNoPendingEditException(shareAccountId));
 
-        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId()) && !checker.isCheckerSuperUser()) {
+        // Maker-identity rule: the same user can never approve their own submission, even when they
+        // hold CHECKER_SUPER_USER - that permission still lets them approve someone ELSE's request,
+        // it just no longer lets them bypass the hold on their own (matches
+        // PortfolioCommandSourceWritePlatformServiceImpl.validateMakerCheckerTransaction(), the
+        // equivalent rule for the classic command pipeline).
+        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId())) {
             throw new ShareAccountEditSelfApprovalNotAllowedException(shareAccountId);
         }
 

fineract-provider/src/main/java/org/apache/fineract/portfolio/shareproducts/service/ShareProductWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl.java

@@ -882,7 +882,11 @@ public class ShareProductWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl implements ShareP
                 .findByProductTypeAndProductIdAndStatus(ProductPendingEdit.TYPE_SHARE, productId, ProductPendingEdit.STATUS_PENDING)
                 .orElseThrow(() -> new ShareProductNoPendingEditException(productId));
 
-        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId()) && !checker.isCheckerSuperUser()) {
+        // Maker-identity rule: the same user can never approve their own submission, even when they
+        // hold CHECKER_SUPER_USER - see
+        // PortfolioCommandSourceWritePlatformServiceImpl.validateMakerCheckerTransaction() for the
+        // equivalent enforcement in the classic command pipeline.
+        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId())) {
             throw new ShareProductSelfApprovalNotAllowedException(productId);
         }
 
@@ -968,7 +972,11 @@ public class ShareProductWritePlatformServiceJpaRepositoryImpl implements ShareP
                 .findByProductTypeAndProductIdAndStatus(ProductPendingEdit.TYPE_SHARE, productId, ProductPendingEdit.STATUS_PENDING)
                 .orElseThrow(() -> new ShareProductNoPendingEditException(productId));
 
-        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId()) && !checker.isCheckerSuperUser()) {
+        // Maker-identity rule: the same user can never approve their own submission, even when they
+        // hold CHECKER_SUPER_USER - see
+        // PortfolioCommandSourceWritePlatformServiceImpl.validateMakerCheckerTransaction() for the
+        // equivalent enforcement in the classic command pipeline.
+        if (pendingEdit.getMaker().getId().equals(checker.getId())) {
             throw new ShareProductSelfApprovalNotAllowedException(productId);
         }
 

fineract-provider/src/main/resources/db/changelog/tenant-store/changelog-tenant-store.xml

@@ -32,4 +32,5 @@
      <include file="parts/0009_set_and_encrypt_ro_if_not_exists.xml" relativeToChangelogFile="true"/>
      <include file="parts/0010_set_datetime_precision.xml" relativeToChangelogFile="true"/>
      <include file="parts/0011_create_api_client.xml" relativeToChangelogFile="true"/>
+     <include file="parts/0012_seed_default_platform_api_client.xml" relativeToChangelogFile="true"/>
 </databaseChangeLog>

fineract-provider/src/main/resources/db/changelog/tenant-store/parts/0012_seed_default_platform_api_client.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<!--
+
+    Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one
+    or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file
+    distributed with this work for additional information
+    regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file
+    to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the
+    "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
+    with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+    Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
+    software distributed under the License is distributed on an
+    "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
+    KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
+    specific language governing permissions and limitations
+    under the License.
+
+-->
+<databaseChangeLog xmlns="http://www.liquibase.org/xml/ns/dbchangelog"
+                   xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
+                   xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.liquibase.org/xml/ns/dbchangelog http://www.liquibase.org/xml/ns/dbchangelog/dbchangelog-4.1.xsd">
+
+    <!-- Seeds ONE fixed, well-known platform-operator API key on every deployment, so
+         #/platform-admin/menu-access works out of the box the first time the app is stood up,
+         without anyone needing shell/DB access to mint the first key by hand. It is deliberately
+         the SAME raw value on every deployment/tenant (requested behaviour) rather than a random
+         one generated per install - the trade-off, on purpose: this value is visible to anyone who
+         can read this source file, exactly like a default admin password shipped in a seed script.
+         It is a bootstrap convenience, not a secret. Rotate it for any deployment that is not purely
+         local/dev: insert a new row with a real random key's hash (see ApiClientCredentialService's
+         hashing) and either deactivate or DELETE this row - POST /v1/apiclients is intentionally
+         disabled (see ApiClientAdminApiResource), so rotation is a direct m_api_client write, same
+         as this seed.
+
+         Raw key (only shown here, since it is fixed and not a secret to rotate away from):
+             cbsx_default_platform_operator_key_2026
+         api_key_hash below is SHA-256 of that exact string, hex-encoded, lowercase - matching
+         ApiClientCredentialService#sha256Hex. -->
+    <changeSet id="0012_seed_default_platform_api_client" author="cbs-nitesh">
+        <preConditions onFail="MARK_RAN">
+            <and>
+                <tableExists tableName="m_api_client"/>
+                <sqlCheck expectedResult="0">
+                    SELECT COUNT(*) FROM m_api_client
+                    WHERE api_key_hash = '9d6d4dfa7a1953e33e0acde4fd775aad11689ec540340c7224796447118a3edd'
+                </sqlCheck>
+            </and>
+        </preConditions>
+        <insert tableName="m_api_client">
+            <column name="client_name" value="Default Platform Operator (rotate before real production use)"/>
+            <column name="api_key_hash" value="9d6d4dfa7a1953e33e0acde4fd775aad11689ec540340c7224796447118a3edd"/>
+            <column name="api_key_prefix" value="cbsx_default"/>
+            <column name="allowed_ips"/>
+            <column name="created_by"/>
+            <column name="created_by_tenant" value="ALL"/>
+        </insert>
+    </changeSet>
+
+</databaseChangeLog>

fineract-provider/src/main/resources/db/changelog/tenant/final-changelog-tenant.xml

@@ -145,7 +145,6 @@
     <include file="parts/0583_save_rbi_form_a_return_job.xml" relativeToChangelogFile="true"/>
     <include file="parts/0584_form9_slr_assets.xml" relativeToChangelogFile="true"/>
     <include file="parts/0582_create_tds_config.xml" relativeToChangelogFile="true"/>
-<<<<<<< HEAD
     <!-- Our local 0575 Loan Originator checker-permission migration collided with dev-latest's own
          0575_rbi_reserve_custom_roles.xml once merged (it was only stashed/uncommitted locally, so it
          never appeared on either side of this merge as a real conflict - the collision only became
@@ -156,7 +155,6 @@
     <include file="parts/0584_add_manage_survey_permissions.xml" relativeToChangelogFile="true"/>
     <include file="parts/0585_add_loan_cob_catchup_permission.xml" relativeToChangelogFile="true"/>
     <include file="parts/0586_add_system_module_checker_permissions.xml" relativeToChangelogFile="true"/>
-=======
-    <include file="parts/0585_fix_current_product_od_scheme_pending_columns.xml" relativeToChangelogFile="true"/>
->>>>>>> dev-latest
+    <include file="parts/0587_fix_current_product_od_scheme_pending_columns.xml" relativeToChangelogFile="true"/>
+    <include file="parts/0588_persist_manually_enabled_maker_checker_permissions.xml" relativeToChangelogFile="true"/>
 </databaseChangeLog>

fineract-provider/src/main/resources/db/changelog/tenant/parts/0587_fix_current_product_od_scheme_pending_columns.xml

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
                    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
                    xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.liquibase.org/xml/ns/dbchangelog http://www.liquibase.org/xml/ns/dbchangelog/dbchangelog-4.1.xsd">
 
-    <changeSet author="CBS" id="0585-1-fix-saving-product-temp-od-min-limit">
+    <changeSet author="CBS" id="0587-1-fix-saving-product-temp-od-min-limit">
         <preConditions onFail="MARK_RAN">
             <and>
                 <tableExists tableName="m_saving_product_temp"/>
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
         </addColumn>
     </changeSet>
 
-    <changeSet author="CBS" id="0585-2-fix-saving-product-temp-od-excess-drawing">
+    <changeSet author="CBS" id="0587-2-fix-saving-product-temp-od-excess-drawing">
         <preConditions onFail="MARK_RAN">
             <and>
                 <tableExists tableName="m_saving_product_temp"/>

fineract-provider/src/main/resources/db/changelog/tenant/parts/0588_persist_manually_enabled_maker_checker_permissions.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<databaseChangeLog xmlns="http://www.liquibase.org/xml/ns/dbchangelog"
+    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
+    xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.liquibase.org/xml/ns/dbchangelog
+        http://www.liquibase.org/xml/ns/dbchangelog/dbchangelog-4.1.xsd">
+
+    <!-- Converts manually-applied Configure Maker Checker Tasks changes into a repeatable migration.
+         During Admin -> Organization and Admin -> System testing, can_maker_checker was switched on
+         (via System -> Configure Maker Checker Tasks) for the 28 permissions below, directly in the
+         dev database - none of that was ever captured by a migration, so a fresh/other environment
+         restored from this changelog history would come up with every one of them still at its
+         originally-seeded false value. Every code here was independently confirmed, via read-only
+         inspection of both its origin changeset and the live database, to be seeded can_maker_checker
+         = false and currently true in the running dev DB with no existing changeset already covering
+         the flip (the one precedent for this pattern, DELETE_OFFICE, was flipped by changeset
+         0538_enable_maker_checker_for_delete_office and is deliberately left untouched here).
+
+         This changeset only ever moves can_maker_checker from false to true for these exact codes -
+         entity_name, action_name, grouping and every other column are left exactly as their origin
+         changeset defined them (including the pre-existing DELETE_ACCOUNTNUMBERFORMAT entity_name
+         drift, which is out of scope for this change and is not corrected here). No _CHECKER row is
+         touched: those already exist for every code below (added earlier by 0583/0586, or by base
+         Fineract for the stock codes), and can_maker_checker is not a column on a _CHECKER row.
+
+         Grouped by the screen each permission belongs to:
+           - Currency Configuration:            UPDATE_CURRENCY
+           - Manage Funds:                      CREATE_FUND
+           - Working Days:                      UPDATE_WORKINGDAYS
+           - Payment Type:                      CREATE_PAYMENTTYPE, UPDATE_PAYMENTTYPE, DELETE_PAYMENTTYPE
+           - Sponsor Banks:                     CREATE_SPONSORBANK, UPDATE_SPONSORBANK
+           - Branch Profile:                    UPDATE_BRANCHPROFILE
+           - Manage Data Tables:                CREATE_DATATABLE, UPDATE_DATATABLE, DELETE_DATATABLE
+           - Manage Codes:                       CREATE_CODE, UPDATE_CODE, DELETE_CODE,
+                                                 CREATE_CODEVALUE, UPDATE_CODEVALUE, DELETE_CODEVALUE
+           - Manage Reports:                    CREATE_REPORT, UPDATE_REPORT, DELETE_REPORT
+           - Manage Hooks:                      CREATE_HOOK, UPDATE_HOOK, DELETE_HOOK
+           - Account Number Preferences:        CREATE_ACCOUNTNUMBERFORMAT, DELETE_ACCOUNTNUMBERFORMAT
+           - Manage User Agreement:             CREATE_USERAGREEMENT
+           - Manage Jobs (COB Workflow Step Reorder): UPDATE_BATCH_BUSINESS_STEP
+
+         Deliberately NOT included (confirmed still false, or out of scope, and left untouched):
+           - UPDATE_PERMISSION, UPDATE_CONFIGURATION (the Configure Maker Checker Tasks self-lockout
+             exclusion added by PermissionReadPlatformServiceImpl stays in effect; these remain false)
+           - UPDATE_SPONSORDDGLMAPPING, all Entity-to-Entity Mapping, External Services and Manage
+             Survey permissions (confirmed still false - never actually toggled on)
+           - CREATE_ROLE/UPDATE_ROLE/DELETE_ROLE/etc., CREATE_GLACCOUNT, CREATE_CHARGE,
+             CREATE_LOANPRODUCT, CREATE_SAVINGSPRODUCT and other permissions observed to already be
+             true in the live DB but belonging to Accounting/Products/Roles modules, not Admin ->
+             Organization or Admin -> System - out of scope for this change and left as pre-existing
+             drift for a separate decision. -->
+    <changeSet id="0588_persist_manually_enabled_maker_checker_permissions" author="cbs-anshul">
+        <update tableName="m_permission">
+            <column name="can_maker_checker" valueBoolean="true"/>
+            <where>code IN (
+                'UPDATE_CURRENCY',
+                'CREATE_FUND',
+                'UPDATE_WORKINGDAYS',
+                'CREATE_PAYMENTTYPE', 'UPDATE_PAYMENTTYPE', 'DELETE_PAYMENTTYPE',
+                'CREATE_SPONSORBANK', 'UPDATE_SPONSORBANK',
+                'UPDATE_BRANCHPROFILE',
+                'CREATE_DATATABLE', 'UPDATE_DATATABLE', 'DELETE_DATATABLE',
+                'CREATE_CODE', 'UPDATE_CODE', 'DELETE_CODE',
+                'CREATE_CODEVALUE', 'UPDATE_CODEVALUE', 'DELETE_CODEVALUE',
+                'CREATE_REPORT', 'UPDATE_REPORT', 'DELETE_REPORT',
+                'CREATE_HOOK', 'UPDATE_HOOK', 'DELETE_HOOK',
+                'CREATE_ACCOUNTNUMBERFORMAT', 'DELETE_ACCOUNTNUMBERFORMAT',
+                'CREATE_USERAGREEMENT',
+                'UPDATE_BATCH_BUSINESS_STEP'
+            )</where>
+        </update>
+    </changeSet>
+
+</databaseChangeLog>

fineract-provider/src/test/java/org/apache/fineract/commands/service/CommandSourceServiceTest.java

@@ -116,7 +116,11 @@ public class CommandSourceServiceTest {
     }
 
     @Test
-    public void testProcessCommand_NonGLAccount_SuperUser_BypassesMakerChecker() {
+    public void testProcessCommand_NonGLAccount_SuperUser_OwnSubmission_DoesNotBypassMakerChecker() {
+        // A maker who happens to hold CHECKER_SUPER_USER must not auto-approve their own submission -
+        // CHECKER_SUPER_USER only ever lets its holder approve a DIFFERENT user's request (see
+        // PortfolioCommandSourceWritePlatformServiceImpl.validateMakerCheckerTransaction()). This
+        // replaces the old bypass this test used to assert.
         NewCommandSourceHandler handler = Mockito.mock(NewCommandSourceHandler.class);
         JsonCommand jsonCommand = Mockito.mock(JsonCommand.class);
         CommandSource commandSource = Mockito.mock(CommandSource.class);
@@ -125,6 +129,8 @@ public class CommandSourceServiceTest {
         Mockito.when(commandSource.getPermissionCode()).thenReturn("WITHDRAW_SAVINGSACCOUNT");
         Mockito.when(commandSource.getEntityName()).thenReturn("SAVINGSACCOUNT");
         Mockito.when(commandSource.getActionName()).thenReturn("WITHDRAW");
+        Mockito.when(commandSource.getId()).thenReturn(300L);
+        Mockito.when(commandSource.getResourceId()).thenReturn(400L);
         Mockito.when(configurationDomainService.isMakerCheckerEnabledForTask("WITHDRAW_SAVINGSACCOUNT")).thenReturn(true);
         Mockito.when(superUser.isCheckerSuperUser()).thenReturn(true);
 
@@ -132,12 +138,12 @@ public class CommandSourceServiceTest {
                 .withCommandId(1L).build();
         Mockito.when(handler.processCommand(jsonCommand)).thenReturn(dummyResult);
 
-        org.apache.fineract.infrastructure.core.data.CommandProcessingResult result = underTest.processCommand(handler, jsonCommand,
-                commandSource, superUser, false);
+        Assertions.assertThrows(org.apache.fineract.commands.exception.RollbackTransactionNotApprovedException.class, () -> {
+            underTest.processCommand(handler, jsonCommand, commandSource, superUser, false);
+        });
 
-        Assertions.assertNotNull(result);
-        Mockito.verify(commandSource).markAsChecked(superUser);
-        Mockito.verify(commandSource, Mockito.never()).markAsAwaitingApproval();
+        Mockito.verify(commandSource).markAsAwaitingApproval();
+        Mockito.verify(commandSource, Mockito.never()).markAsChecked(any());
     }
 
     @Test